



Panel Discussion with Japan-US Military Statesmen

Panelists:

Admiral Takashi Saito,

2nd Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

General Ryoichi Oriki,

3rd Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

General Richard Myers,

15th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Air Force

Admiral Michael Mullen,

17th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Navy

“Balancing hedges with engagements, bring China into the world standards”

Japan National Press Club (JNPC) , Tokyo, Japan

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Japan-U.S. Military Statesmen Forum was established by Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF) in Tokyo in partnership with Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in Washington, DC. It aims to strengthen policy dialogues between Japan and the U.S. through a platform in which the strategic insights, shared values and wisdom are drawn from both retired SDF and U.S. Military personnel.

In cooperation with RJIF, Japan National Press has invited 4 core members who participated in the first meeting of the Forum, which was held in July in Tokyo.

Against the background of the drastically changing security situation in the Far East, views were expressed on wide-ranging issues such as the present Japan-U.S. security alliance, America's rebalancing policy, the collective self defense right in conjunction with a review of Japan-U.S. Defence guidelines, the expansion of China's military capability, and how presently tense Japan-ROK relations affect the security situation in this region.

Moderator: Hiroki Sugita, member of JNPC planning committee (Kyodo News)

Japan National Press Club You-tube Channel

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXpwupkLi7Q&list=UU_iMvY293APrYBx0CJReIVw&index=14

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Moderator Hiroki Sugita: [*speaks in Japanese*] Thank you very much for coming. Thank you indeed for coming despite the very hot weather. We would now like to start the panel discussion, thoughts about the US-Japan Alliance. For the next two hours we will have a discussion amongst the esteemed members of the panel who are military statesmen from the US and Japan. We would like to take an in-depth look at the US-Japan Alliance through this panel discussion.

Very briefly I would like to introduce the four members of the panel, but since they need no introduction, I would like to only briefly introduce them. Seated right next to me is Admiral Takashi Saito, 2nd Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, JMSDF. Next to Admiral Saito is General Ryoichi Oriki, 3rd Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, JGSDF. And then General Richard Myers, 15th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Air Force. And last but not least we have Admiral Michael Mullen, the 17th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Navy.

The four members on the panel were attending the meeting, the Japan-U.S. Military Statesmen Forum, which was held for the first time to discuss the US-Japan Alliance, and after that forum they were kind enough to visit the Press Club to participate in this panel discussion.

The Japan-U.S. Military Statesmen Forum was co-organized by RJIF and CNAS.

From Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF), we have Chairman Dr. Funabashi, so I would like to ask Dr. Funabashi to give us an overview of the forum and the background leading up to this panel discussion.

Yoichi Funabashi: [*speaks in Japanese*] Thank you very much for the kind introduction, Mr. Sugita. I am Funabashi. Members of the press of the Japan National Press Club and other journalists, I would like to express my appreciation for giving me this opportunity.

The Japan-U.S. Military Statesmen Forum is the conference that we have just convened. We would like to make this an annual event alternating between Tokyo and Washington D.C., and we just had the kickoff meeting. The objective of this forum is as follows: the environment surrounding Japan and the Japan-US Alliance is going through a sweeping transformation, and the Japan-US relationship does not have the rock-solid foundation that we used to enjoy in the past, and I have had concerns about this.

And I always felt that the US forces and servicemen and the Japan Self-Defense Forces, particularly the ones who served in top-ranking positions of the US military and Japan Self-Defense Forces, to have a candid exchange of views on policy, and share those with active

duty personnel, who also participated as observers. And over the course of two days, yesterday and today, we had very intense meetings.

There are many meetings which are said to be strategic, but I think our forum could deliver a strategic dialogue in a true sense as the members had candid and honest exchanges. The Japan National Press Club has been so kind as to give us this opportunity, and therefore I have asked four core members of the Japan-U.S. Military Statesmen Forum to come in for a panel discussion. Thank you very much indeed to the Press Club for this opportunity.

As for next year, 2015, we would like to convene the second meeting on June 22 and 23 in Washington, DC. I would once again like to express my gratitude to the members of the Military Statesmen Forum and the National Press Club.

Moderator: [speaks in Japanese] Thank you very much. I understand that very frank dialogue took place, and during this panel discussion, although it is open to the public and to the press, about the strategic alliance, we would like to see a frank discussion. I forgot to introduce myself. I have the honor of moderating the session. My name is Sugita from Kyodo News Service and I am also serving on the Planning Committee of the Japan National Press Club.

Now, without further ado, I would like to invite the four panelists to give us opening remarks. And I would first like to ask Admiral Saito to start, please.

Admiral Takashi Saito: [*speaks in Japanese*] Thank you very much for the introduction. As I was introduced earlier, I had the honor of serving as 2nd Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff. It's been five years since I retired, and this is the second occasion for me to speak at the Japan National Press Club.

This time, for the first time ever, between the United States and Japan we had discussions amongst the retired senior officers of JSDF and US forces. We believe that since we are retired, we will not directly affect policies, however we, as retired generals and admirals, we were hoping that our know-how and experience can be reflected in the current policies in today's difficult security environment. Dr. Funabashi took the leadership to organize the forum.

Regional security is very difficult, as all of you know. In the current policies, the security policies are undergoing a major transformation. There is also a rebalancing policy in the United States and the reduction of the national defense budget; there are these various difficulties. And in order

to have true coordination between the US and Japan and to have in-depth discussion, we felt the need for these, and that is why the forum was held.

About what was discussed during the forum, I believe there will be opportunities later for us to comment. We have discussed our awareness of the situations and there was also a discussion of the Dynamic Joint Defense Force under the National Defense Program Guidelines, and the US rebalancing policy, we were able to have a very frank discussion on a number of topics including these.

With these serving as a trigger, we hope that the forum will serve as a catalyst for further deepening of the US-Japan Alliance. Of course efforts have always been under way to deepen the US-Japan Alliance, but we hope that the forum will serve as an additional catalyst for an in-depth alliance.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] Thank you very much. I would now like to call on General Oriki.

General Ryoichi Oriki: [*speaks in Japanese*] After Admiral Saito I served as 3rd Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff. Thank you for this opportunity. It has been two-and-a-half years since I retired. Having said that, I feel as if I can return to active duty immediately if I'm asked to do so. I feel I am energetic enough mentally and physically and I have strong emotions about the SDF. For 40 years I worked for this organization and I think I will continue to have this mentality and mindset.

Dr. Funabashi has planned and organized this forum, and as a result we were able to have a forum consultation between the United States and Japan, for which we are very grateful. And between Admiral Mullen and myself, during March 11, we were able to work together, and we experienced difficulties together after the tsunami and nuclear incident, so our ties go back to those days. And after some hiatus I was able to renew a friendship with Admiral Mullen, and personally, therefore, the forum was a pleasure to participate in.

As for the SDF and US forces, we have a longstanding relationship spanning several decades. Through training and disaster response, in order for the SDF to conduct operations, in order for Japan to conduct operations with US forces, the basis of the cooperation, coordination, are person-to-person connections. Of course unit-to-unit coordination and connection are important but the network amongst the officers is very important, and I was able to recognize that again fortunately during this forum.

Admiral Saito briefly mentioned what was discussed at the forum. Since the end of last year, the Japanese government has made a number of moves, including the establishment of the National Security Strategy, and the promotion of various other strategies, and those were presented and explained, and we believe that overall understanding was deepened.

We would like to utilize these opportunities to further promote exchange of information and sharing of understanding. I believe these efforts continue to be important. When it comes to the security environment, the more difficult the environment becomes, the more important it becomes between militaries on both sides for cooperation and communication to take place. Otherwise we'll lose the sense of direction. Although I'm an old boy, to active duty members I would like to request that there be close communication and cooperation, and we hope that through participating in this forum we will be indirectly supporting communication and cooperation at the active duty level.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] So now I would like to call upon General Meyers.

General Richard Myers: I would like to first thank Dr. Funabashi for organizing what we think is the first annual forum that we hope to continue certainly for some years. My background, I was Commander, US Forces Japan, from 1993 to 1996, and then my last position in the military was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2001 to 2005. I was 15th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Sitting next to me was the 17th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

What I'd like to give you is a sense of the atmospherics that surrounded this first session that we had. The advantage that all of us had, the Americans and Japanese that participated, was that we had this long relationship with the other country and we had a lot of respect for our security relations here and the knowledge that it was really, really important, not just to the two countries, but to the region or for that matter to the world.

So you can imagine the atmospherics were actually very cordial, because my first exposure to Japan was in 1970, stationed on Okinawa, finished of course in the '90s when I stationed at Yokota Air Base. It's been a long relationship and one that I care deeply about as does everybody that was involved in this first inaugural event.

Over those years you build up a lot of trust with those that you work with, and that's an essential ingredient of course to a relationship is to have the trust developed, and that showed prominently in our discussions. Because we are not any longer responsible, it doesn't mean we don't have opinions on various issues, so we were able to have very candid discussions, and the atmosphere

was such that people felt they could say whatever they had to say and we would discuss those issues in a very frank, candid, and in an atmosphere of trust and respect because it's been built up over the many years that we've been part of this relationship.

We talked perhaps mainly about security, as maybe you would expect ex-military people to talk about, but not exclusively, because I think it's the military folks that understand that when you deal with security issues, they're not just military issues. There are also issues that involve other instruments of national power, such as diplomacy, such as economics I would say today, informational and instruments of power as well. So our discussions were wide-ranging, not just on the military aspects of security but more broadly.

I think out of this will come first of all, a much better informed group because we covered all the current topics and we had some great briefings from people currently in government who helped us understand the current issues in depth.

And we're always prepared to provide advice if anybody wants to listen and we're asked, but more importantly I think, as we go back to our normal day activities wherever we live, we're going to be better informed and then better able to inform others about this relationship because it always surprises me how perhaps in Japan, in America, how little understanding there is about the depth of this relationship and what it means to both countries, and, more importantly, even what it means to the region.

So I think we're much better able after this dialogue at this forum to perform that function, which I think is important for those of us that have passed the torch on to others.

So it was an honor and privilege to be part of it, and I thank you, and we look forward to questions.

Moderator: *[speaks in Japanese]* Thank you very much. So Admiral Mullen.

Admiral Michael Mullen: I'd like to express my gratitude to Dr. Funabashi and he had a terrific support staff that made this possible. I actually first kind of recognized Dr. Funabashi's work when I saw his report on the Fukushima tragedy and I was taken aback at its thoroughness, its frankness, and its focus on learning in what was a very, very tragic and difficult situation, so when Dr. Funabashi asked me to participate in this, it was before he even could ask the question I was very much inclined to say yes.

It is particularly distinct pleasure to be reunited with two very good friends, Admiral Saito and General Oriki. Actually Admiral Saito and I were colleagues when he was in charge of the Maritime Self-Defense Force here and I was in charge of the US Navy. Little did either one of us know that we would be joining the joint world, but join it we did to the betterment of ourselves and our relationship.

And the relationship, my own relationship with Japan, like General Myers, the first time I set foot on Japanese soil was in 1969 in Sasebo and fell in love with the land and the people and it has remained so ever since, so it's very easy for me to come back and to try to participate in continuing strengthening this relationship.

Secondly, this region has always been critical, and it will, it is now, and it will continue to be critical, so the commitment on the part of the United States, our other friends in the region, and in particular the focus on this alliance and what it means is absolutely foundational for the security and stability in the future.

It's very clear as I have stood back in recent months having, actually in the last couple of years, been very close to the tragedy of 3/11 and how important our relationship was then and how we worked together and also how we struggled together in that crisis, that there was a great deal that we accomplished, and also clearly there was a great deal to learn in terms of improving how we work together and that's some of what we talked about. Today we should not wait for a crisis to figure that out.

The initiatives that have currently taken place in Japan, I watch them. It's been incredibly valuable to me over the last couple of days to understand the details of them and what they mean, and we do that, as General Myers said, in support of those who currently wear the uniform and have the responsibility because we no longer have the responsibility, and I'm very sensitive to that. But there is a body of wisdom that is here over, literally, when you combine, just looking in the room, my good friend Admiral Blair is here as well, it's literally hundreds of years of experience that we could hope to draw on to continue to enhance this relationship at a time when the world is changing rapidly and everybody needs to move at that pace or quite frankly, whether it's in the security environment or the economic environment or the diplomatic environment, everybody needs to be moving at that pace or we get left behind.

So I think you have a group certainly from the United States that's very committed historically to this relationship, and, as General Myers said, this is the first annual, and we hope that it will

happen for many, many years in the future. So it's great to be back, great to participate, and I look forward to your questions as well.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] Thank you very much. Admiral Mullen mentioned in his opening remarks that we have another member of the US-Japan Military Statesmen Forum who made a huge contribution to the US-Japan Alliance with us. Admiral Dennis Blair, the former Pacific commander, is here. I would like to ask Admiral Blair to also give us a comment. Admiral Blair is a sub-member of the forum. I understand that he also took part in the forum. Admiral Blair, please.

Admiral Dennis Blair: Among the five members of the American participants in this dialogue, we have probably 200 years of experience working with the Japan Self-Defense Forces, and I'd like to pass on a little bit of that wisdom to you reporters and I hope you will tell your readers.

Japan has just gone through a very controversial and difficult set of political decisions concerning collective self defense, and I know that many Japanese citizens have some hesitations and they have some doubts about whether Japan should have a more prominent, a more assertive national security policy. They remember some of the actions of the past in which aggressive Japanese actions caused great trouble for this country.

But I would just like to say from all of us who have worked with the modern Japan Self-Defense Forces, the members of the Japanese government who deal in national security, that we welcome, we favor, we strongly support a more normal, more active, more responsible role for the armed forces, the Self-Defense Forces of Japan. Japan has been over the last 70 years probably one of a very small number of the most peaceful and responsible countries in the entire world in the values that it favors, in the way that it has used its power. And as situations change, it seems to me, it seems to all of us, that Japan has a lot more to contribute to security, to development, both in this part of the world and in other parts of the world, by giving a responsible and active role to its security forces, the Self-Defense Forces, the Coast Guard, and all of those forces.

So I would like Japanese citizens to be proud of their Self-Defense Forces, to have trust and faith in their Self-Defense Forces, and realize that they can give those Self-Defense Forces the job of supporting the interests of Japan, the interests of peaceful development of the world in a much more active and positive way in the future. And those of us who have dealt with the officers who lead these Self-Defense Forces, the soldiers, the sailors, and airmen who serve in them, we would certainly welcome that development in the world. Thank you.

Moderator: *[speaks in Japanese]* Thank you very much, Admiral Blair. So we have heard the initial comments by the guest speakers. So as some have already mentioned, they are retired servicemen. They are out of uniform so they can be even more frank and candid in making their points. This is the Japan National Press Club – from time to time some questions might be blunt and straightforward, but please do excuse us in advance for such questions.

I would like to raise a few questions myself as moderator. I would like to hear your initial response from the panelists. This is a panel discussion, so if you want to give additional reactions or additional remarks to comments which have already been made by other panelists, you are free to jump in. Do not hesitate to give some additional remarks.

I would like to start off with the understanding or the recognition of the existing situation. Listening to the initial remarks from the panelists, the regional security environment has gone through a major change, and we also recognize this change, and when we are doing daily reporting of the news, we are working on that premise that there has been this change in the environment, and therefore we have to enhance the Japan-US Alliance and we have to enhance our security policy in various ways.

So going back to the point of origin, so to speak, with regard to the change in the security environment, what is your understanding of the situation? I'd like to hear from the four panelists.

We are always mostly concerned about the issue of China, and there is military expansionism and also maritime advances being made by China, and modernization of their defense equipment, military equipment, also the military doctrine, whether China is going to change this or not. And to such developments by China, the Japan-US Alliance, how should we respond to China? These are fundamental questions with regard to how you regard the current situation.

So I would like to hear from all of the four panelists on this. First of all, maybe we can reverse the order from the initial one, so may I call upon Admiral Mullen, could you kick off please on this?

Mullen: I think clearly we talked at some length about the current situation in the region. One of the questions that were raised was with respect to the United States and its rebalancing strategy. I think President Obama, when he turned the strategic focus to this region, did exactly the right thing. I have believed for years now that the 21st century is a century that will be dominated by this part of the world, the Asia-Pacific, principally because of the economic powerhouses that exist in this part of the world, and so that just reemphasizes the need for continued stability very specifically.

All of us are working our way through a relationship with China. China is in many ways the elephant in the room as it has continued to grow and expand and assert itself. I've also said for a long time there's no reason that we can't, we, the United States, have a constructive relationship with China that doesn't result in a conflict. And I think the foundation of that is going to be economics. At the same time, China continues to evolve and invest heavily in its military in ways that many of us don't quite understand. We can't see the intent, if you will. Certainly they have every right to grow, and if they grow peacefully I think that's fine and that's for the betterment of the world, but understanding that more clearly, I think we have to understand that better.

To create and sustain stability in the region we have to have very strong relationships here, including the Japanese-US relationship. There have been concerns expressed about the United States budget. My view is also the United States has spent two to three trillion dollars in the last 12 years at war. Obviously it wasn't in this region but we haven't lost focus on this region, and the United States' commitment to the region in terms of rebalancing to something like the TPP is indicative of that.

Will there be ups and downs? Absolutely. But the opportunity that is now created I think as these changes are being made in Japan to work more closely with a longstanding ally in ways which are supportive, that can create a strong deterrent to any aggression in this region is absolutely critical, and we have to work through the specifics of training together, what's the doctrine, what are the command and control pieces, what's the structure, et cetera. And we have a lot to learn from each other, and we've also advanced quite significantly in recent years, so I'm actually very, very optimistic.

Most critically, it is to ensure that the region stays stable, which is best for the Japanese people and best for the people throughout the region, and quite frankly, in a global world, throughout the world.

Moderator: *[speaks in Japanese]* Thank you very much. So I would like to call upon General Myers.

Myers: I'll just add a couple of things on China, that any nation's relationship with China is indeed complex. On the one hand we have these interdependencies that are economic-based; on the other hand we have issues in terms of some of their actions in the East China Sea, South China Sea, in cyber, and in space. So there are issues that we have to deal with. I completely agree

with Admiral Mullen that we must engage with China and try to find a way to build a transparent and trusting relationship that will lead to good behavior by all parties for sure.

We also discussed the threat from the DPRK, certainly an issue well-known to Japan because Japan is so close, also an issue to the United States because the missiles they have in North Korea can reach the continental United States and it has caused the United States of course to spend a lot of money on our missile defense systems to defend against that possibility that we'll receive a missile from North Korea. I don't know whether there's much more to say about that except that we're all concerned.

In terms of South Korea, it was interesting that we all have very close and long relationships with South Korea, but right now I would say there's a tension in that relationship, particularly between Japan and South Korea, and we talked about that tension and perhaps ways of trying to reduce that. So that was part of the security landscape that we evaluated and we talked about, and I think I'll throw it over to Oriki-san.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] General Oriki, please.

Oriki: [*speaks in Japanese*] Regarding major changes in terms of security, this is not only in the Asian region but we have to take a global perspective because there are the Middle East and Ukraine and close to us Asian situations. Emerging countries are rising economically and otherwise, and therefore, against this backdrop, there is a huge change in the balance of power. We need to have this awareness and there are more activities, which could lead to higher probability of contingencies. And that is my overall understanding of the situation.

As for the Asian region, as it was mentioned earlier, be it the Korean Peninsula, under the Kim Jong-un regime there seem to be efforts to establish a stronger power base, and DPRK is engaged in provocative actions and statements, and in that sense there is an increased threat on the Korean Peninsula. Regarding nuclear and ballistic missiles, there are possibly improvements in terms of quality and technology, and therefore we need to pay close attention.

As for China, when we look at the military spending I think we will be able to have a better understanding. It has quadrupled in the past ten years. Russia, on the other hand, has about 8 trillion yen in defense budget. The modernization of the military has been done quite strategically in China, and there is a focus on the navy and air force in modernization of the armed forces. That seems to be the emphasis of the modernization in China.

Realistically, Joint Staff Office has announced the number of scrambles, and in areas surrounding Japan, the number of trainings conducted by China, and the number of advances in the Pacific area by China. I believe the major turning point was 2008 or 2009, and the number of these activities are increasing year by year, and that is something that we can readily see from the press reports as well.

Vis-à-vis this situation how should we respond is the question. Rather than confronting that militarily, we believe that we have to think about the deterrents. What is at the root of deterrence is that the SDF must make efforts and strengthen the US-Japan Alliance. A strengthened US-Japan Alliance can serve as a good foundation for deterrence.

In any event, given this major change in the security environment, what we have to be careful about is that although there are a number of issues, including the Senkakus, by coercion or the use of force, if there are any attempts to change the current status and to create a fait accompli, we have to be determined to protect the things that we must protect.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] So may I call upon Admiral Saito?

Saito: [*speaks in Japanese*] Well, how I regard the situation in terms of this region and in terms of the entire world, of course there are many angles to address this question, but from a global perspective there is the energy question, especially developments with regard to shale gas and how this will impact the overall energy supply in the world.

And of course in terms of the overall security environment, this is a crucial question to take into account. So this is from the global perspective that I am raising this issue.

And as General Oriki has pointed out, there are issues of North Korea, China, East China Sea, and South China Sea. It is an urgent agenda for us to address and utilize in a stable manner cyberspace and outer space, which are global commons.

And if I may further delve into this question, looking at China I have been trying to focus on certain aspects. The so-called gray zone situations, they fall short of the hot war of a combat situation, but the situation preceding that, in terms of the question of sovereignty, how we will be able to further enhance the level of deterrence between Japan and the United States with regard to such gray zone situations, that is the most important question going forward.

For instance, in various locations we should have joint training, joint exercises between Japan and the United States, and we should seriously consider this. So when we talk about deterrence, nuclear deterrence or conventional deterrence, you get the image that forces are quickly dispatched in terms of contingency, and of course we have to exercise deterrence so such a situation will not arise.

But even prior to such contingencies, in gray zone situations how we will be able to deter the situation, that is the most important question. At least between Japan and the United States, we could arrive at a common understanding to a certain degree according to my personal assessment.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] Admiral Saito talked about the so-called gray zone situations, and concerning such gray zone situations, I think that is quite an important question. And how we should respond to these gray zone situations, the US side, what kind of understanding do you have with regard to gray zone situations? So maybe I can invite the US panelists, both General Myers and Admiral Mullen, if you have any comments to contribute.

Myers: Do you want me to start? Well, I think that one of the more interesting parts of our forum was to discuss these gray zone issues which are short of armed conflict but could be influential in the outcome of events and how you might deal with them, and I think nations are different in how they're equipped to deal with those. I think it could be one of the strengths of the US-Japan Alliance that together we would have the capabilities to deal with gray zone sort of issues that perhaps we don't have today. So there would be some things that would probably have to be developed, strategies to be developed, plans developed, and some ability to handle the crises when they arise. But if you look at situations that are short of the use of military force but could be influential, the Senkakus is one of those areas that could be a gray zone issue, and how well equipped is the Alliance to deal with that, and that's a question I'm not sure we have all the answers at this point.

But I think the more interesting points that came out of our discussions were these gray zone issues, how they are viewed from the standpoint of Japan and the US, as well as how to try to come to a consensus on dealing with them.

Mullen: The only thing I'd add is, in particular, specifically with respect to the Senkakus. The question comes up in terms of where the United States is. And I think, President Obama, in his most recent visit, made it very clear that we would strongly support our Article 5 obligations with respect to those islands, and from that perspective I think it looks, it's meant to draw a very clear

line about what the United States would do in support of Japan specifically. So I hope that the grayness with respect to that has actually disappeared.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] Thank you very much for your clear answers. On China, since we have two former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have a question. During your tenure, with the PLA, People's Liberation Army of China, military exchange was actively promoted and pursued to improve the transparency of the Chinese military.

But on the other hand, what we hear is that through such exchange China was only receiving information about the US military's movements, and transparency on the part of China did not improve at all. That is a criticism that we've heard and the United States continues to promote military exchange with China, but what are the results, achievements, from an exchange with China militarily? What is your current assessment? I would like to pose this question to the two US panelists.

Myers: The relationship and the attempt to build a relationship, a security relationship, military-to-military relationship with China, has been ongoing for many years. It's had its ups and downs based on incidents sometimes beyond the control of either nation, and I'm thinking about the relationship was starting to gain traction, the military-to-military relationship, when the US bombed the Chinese embassy in the former Yugoslavia, and so that set things back obviously, and then it started to build again, and then we had the EP-3 collision with one of the Chinese fighters that was forced to land on Hainan Island, which set the relationship back again.

But in general I would say the trend line has been up, both under President Clinton where I was vice-chairman, and President Bush where I was chairman. There was a priority on working this particular relationship. The two presidents put a lot of priority on that to try to develop more transparency between our two militaries.

One of the issues we would always bring up with China is reciprocity. We seem to be always willing to show them more than they are willing to show us, so I'm sure when Admiral Mullen has a chance to speak he will say that he got to see and do things in China that I was not able to see and do.

I was just in China about a month ago. I talked to General Dempsey, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before I left, and he said that the US and China military-to-military relationship was actually pretty good, and I think one of the things that would be testimony to that would be that after the US Department of Justice indicted three Chinese military officers for

cyber-warfare crimes, the Chinese PLA made the decision to go ahead and participate in RIMPAC only so it didn't become one of those points in the relationship where you went backwards for a while, you kept moving forward.

Having said that, reciprocity is always an issue. Transparency is always an issue, and it's just one of the things that has to be tended to, like any relationship, on a regular basis.

Mullen: I would agree with what General Myers is saying in terms of measurement of change because historically if there was an unpleasant incident, essentially the mil-to-mil got cut off. And in terms of what General Myers just said, for the mil-to-mil to not be cut off recently based on those indictments I think is pretty significant. In fact, because of this history, because of the history of us always showing them a lot and them never showing us much, when I was both the CNO as well as when I was chairman I made a visit in each case towards the end of those tours, and in each case I made it very clear that if I wasn't going to get to see significant capability with respect to the navy in the first case and the military in the second that I wasn't going to come. In fact, in 2007 I actually cancelled my visit very late because it wasn't working out and actually that got rescheduled.

And while I was there, both as CNO and as chairman, I actually got to see significant capability that was in a way very responsive to what I had laid out to my counterpart when General Chen in this case had come to the United States.

I couldn't agree more. I think in terms of what General Myers said, tending to these relationships, this is new territory, this is new turf. Some of what, and I'm very critical of China in many ways, but I think some of what we see China doing is learning to be a player on the global stage. They are out, they are certainly globally present because of the economy if nothing else, and so we're going to go through some of these ups and downs. I think all of us are going to go through some of these ups and downs, and we have to stay engaged. I think to walk away from that then invites an opportunity for potential disaster or conflict.

Moderator: *[speaks in Japanese]* Thank you very much for that. With concrete examples, I was able to deepen the understanding. I would like to move to the next question.

The Japanese government will partially recognize the exercise of the collective self defense and adopted a Cabinet decision in July to make this possible, and the Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines will be revised in response to this Cabinet decision. In a nutshell, what do you expect

from the revision of the guidelines, so what kind of character do you expect in terms of the guideline revision?

And another point that I wish to raise with regard to the guidelines is they are talking about the end of the year in terms of the target date for agreement on the revision of the Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines. So they are coming up with a deadline so to speak. In the Japan-US Security Consultative (2+2) Meeting, the ministers reached an agreement on this and there is a very significant change taking place in the security environment. Do you think it is really possible to come to a conclusion and come to an agreement with all respects of the guidelines by the end of the year? I personally feel that we should take more time to make it even better and further improve upon the revision of the guidelines.

So I would like to hear from all of the four panelists because this is an important agenda for the Japan-US Alliance, so maybe you can start, Admiral Saito.

Saito: [*speaks in Japanese*] According to newspaper reports, et cetera, it has been reported that the guidelines will be reviewed with a target of the end of the year, so the current Cabinet decision, how that affects the review of the guidelines, those who are in responsible positions and those who are on active duty will have to make decisions as to how the Cabinet decision should be reflected in the guideline review. Therefore, as retired military personnel, in that capacity, the cyber and space domain, what the framework should be between Japan and the United States, serious thought needs to be given in the review of the guidelines.

As for the South China Sea and the East China Sea, multilateral cooperation in these territories, how such multilateral cooperation can be constructed is another point. On this point, perhaps the collective self defense was decided at the Cabinet level, but legally there need to be revisions of the laws and whether such a multilateral mechanism is possible or not, I'm not certain yet. However, that is at least indicated as a direction.

And multinational training, et cetera, how a multilateral framework can be established as a way of hedging vis-à-vis China, so this is another important topic. And the gray zones, the so-called gray zone situation and how the US and Japan should respond to gray zone issues, I believe these need to be seriously considered as the guidelines are reviewed.

And if I may discuss more detailed matters, when guidelines are being reviewed, I am sure there will be potential scenarios established based on which discussions and review will take place. And C2, Command and Control, is an issue, a potential issue as we see it. In order for joint activities to

take place between the US and Japan in terms of command and control, who are the counterparts and who are to coordinate? As seen from the top place, NSC in Japan and NSC in the US, now there is a counterpart established in Japan so there can be counterpart-to-counterpart interaction on the NSC level. This was a major change. And there is a hierarchy at the joint chief level and the level below, and there is a multitude of layers in terms of hierarchy and how each level of hierarchy coordination can be made. It may be perhaps difficult for non-military people to understand but I believe the same applies to businesses' commercial activities. When businesses are to be undertaken, counterpart-to-counterpart arrangements on the same level have to be made, otherwise consultation will be confused. So we have to sort out and organize and find the matching counterpart. That needs to be sorted out and organized.

Moderator: *[speaks in Japanese]* So may I call upon General Oriki?

Oriki: *[speaks in Japanese]* Admiral Saito expressed almost all of the points that I wanted to make. With regard to changing the interpretation of the collective self defense right, a Cabinet decision has been adopted and the Diet will decide on the guidelines.

So what has to be done is that in terms of the guidelines, the existing guidelines had to do with the surrounding areas of Japan, but there have been sweeping changes in the security environment and therefore the position of Japan and the position of the United States have changed in that context, we have to consider this question.

And with regard to the enactment of the legislation and the Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines, of course the Japanese government is a major decision-maker on this and we have no say to what extent the guidelines have to be completed in order to prepare for legislation. So in response to changes in the environment, so the division of the role and work between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and US forces should be discussed squarely, and there must be a common understanding and recognition of the situation between Japan and the United States as well. These are my personal wishes.

And as Admiral Saito has said, we have to also take into account cyberspace and outer space as new domains. And we see the establishment of the NSC, National Security Council, how it should involve itself in the process and how it should function, since I am not a member of the NSC, I don't really understand this but I have high expectations.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] Thank you very much. General Myers, your turn. Including the recognition of the collective self defense right, what expectations do you have of the guideline revision?

Myers: Well, first of all, I'll just reiterate what Admiral Blair said that I think uniformly the American side thinks that collective self defense is the right path for Japan, although it is Japan's decision, but we think things are moving in the right direction. And your question was, what do we expect from the guidelines?

I guess what I expect, and it will bring it back from some of these wild conjectures that perhaps collective self defense will allow Japan to return to militarism or whatever, I think that's really hyperbole, what I think it's going to do and what we'll get with revision of the guidelines is to be better able for the alliance to defend Japan. That will be primary I believe, and so that will be important. There are things today that keep the alliance from being as effective as it could be in just the task of defending Japan, which is one of the primary purposes for having a mutual security treaty, so I think we'll see that as one of the outputs.

And the only other thing I would say is that you asked about the timeline. We did have active duty officers as observers in this forum. We didn't see them wince when we talked about this, about the guidelines and the revision and so forth, so I don't know if they'll make the timeline or not. All I know is that if you want bureaucracies to respond to need, you usually have to set a goal that's pretty aggressive and then try to hold them to it; otherwise, the time would expand to whatever.

So I don't think you can think about this as that's a milestone that we'll never go back and revisit the guidelines. I think this would be sort of a continuous process, so the first generation may be the end of this year if they can make that. There will be other iterations, and so they can have time to be contemplative and reflect and modify things if they need to.

Mullen: I would just reemphasize what both Admiral Blair and General Myers have said in terms of I think it's time. The transformation that has taken place globally as well as in the region, this change I think matches that need very clearly. And then with respect to studying it longer, certainly, this is a decision for the government of Japan.

Myers: Absolutely.

Mullen: But I've also been in bureaucracies that could study things for a long time, not make any significant improvements based on that, when we could have implemented it, learned as we went, to include the training, the exercises, and the kinds of things that have been discussed, and sort of all to the betterment of what is the principle focus of the relationship, which is to provide for the defense of the Japanese people.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] The guidelines and the reinterpretation of collective self defense are primarily for the defense of Japan, and as we report in the media, perhaps in the Iraq war and Afghanistan war, Japan may be asked to dispatch units and forces, but what was commented now is very different from what has been reported in the media, and perhaps there may be questions from the floor later on this point.

Earlier General Oriki mentioned that the stance of the US has also changed. I believe that was in reference to the rebalancing policy. Rebalancing, naturally given the Asian situation, the United States' posture, military posture, cannot be maintained in the same way as in the past, but there are some who say that it is difficult to understand the overall picture of the rebalancing policy. And a rebalance to increase or strengthen deterrence, whether that is indeed the case, that is a question posed.

And inclusive of TPP, the United States' overall commitment is not very visible according to some in Japan. These are some of the questions and voices of dissatisfaction that we hear in Japan when it comes to the rebalancing policy. Perhaps Japan would like to ask the US to clarify and Japan needs to take action in response to clarify the rebalancing policy. Japan should also do its part and it should not only ask what the rebalancing policy means, but under the Obama administration, to put it in simple terms, the question that I would like to pose to Japanese panelists is, are there any wishes in terms of how it can be clarified or how it can be improved? I think if I pose the question this way it will be easier in terms of framing a question. So that is the question for the two Japanese panelists.

And to the US panelists, if there are such requests from Japan, if you could explain the current understanding of the rebalancing policy, and although you may be already out of uniform, perhaps it may be difficult to criticize the policy of the President, but possible improvements of the rebalancing policy, please let us know your ideas.

And starting from General Oriki, please.

Oriki: [*speaks in Japanese*] Concerning the rebalancing of the United States, we did have a lot of debate on this question as well, so starting from the pivot, the naming has been changed to rebalancing. And in February of this year, Daniel Russel, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, testified in Congress, there are six different pillars with regard to the US rebalancing policy according to his evaluation: enhancement of the alliance and how to participate in regional institutions, involvement in China, democratization, amongst others.

And in terms of the enhancement of the alliance, from a military and security perspective, before addressing the question of what we expect out of the United States, we should see it from Japan's perspective. The Abe administration started off with a National Security Strategy and supplemented with the National Security Council and also further considerations to be made in the Diet in terms of the related legislation. In terms of security, I think they are all related to US rebalancing.

And also, from a military perspective, is it the case that nothing is done under the current circumstances? F-22 and Global Hawk have been deployed by the US forces in Japan. Ospreys and P8s are being deployed in Japan. And by the end of 2017, two Aegis BMD vessels will be additionally deployed, and we have seen such concrete steps. Not only in Japan, but in Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines, various military-related countermeasures have been taken in the broad context of East Asia as a region.

So from a military perspective, that's the correct understanding of the situation. From the perspective of rebalancing, what kind of requests and further demands we should make of the United States? And in the consultations on the revision of the Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines, in light of the latest situation, this is a question that should be further considered by Japan and the United States.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] Admiral Saito, please.

Saito: [*speaks in Japanese*] First of all, as General Oriki has mentioned, the rebalance issue as seen from the military perspective, there tends to be a focus on the shifting of forces from one region to another, but rebalancing should be regarded in a broader scope, including economic issues and other issues. And what to do with the alliance in this region, rebalancing should be understood in a broader sense, but I believe that there is a tendency to have a narrow interest in rebalancing.

Rebalancing, when that terminology is used, under that rebalancing policy can Japan request the United States to do one thing or another? That may be asking too much. Rather, what Japan can do, what Japan can make as efforts, what Japan is able to do, and sharing of information, how to share information. When information is shared then the force capacity, a smaller force may suffice to do the same task in a more proactive way to improve efficiency, and to improve capability, initiatives can be taken more from Japan. The Abe administration should be more proactive in taking initiatives rather than simply asking for certain things, waiting for things to be given from the other side. I think the times have changed and Japan should be taking more proactive initiatives. That is my view on rebalancing.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] So Japanese should be more proactive in this. Admiral Mullen, please.

Mullen: With respect to what was the pivot strategy and is now I think more appropriately renamed rebalancing, my view then and now is that the United States is going to stay, remain, a global power, and the ability to not just rebalance here but balance in the world is going to continue to be a challenge, and I certainly think recent events show that, with respect to what's happened in the Ukraine and what's going on in the Middle East.

And as much as some may like to think the Middle East is going to become less of a problem, I'm not one that believes that. I think the United States is going to have to stay engaged in the Middle East for a long time to come. Likewise, our friends in Europe certainly have expectations that we stay engaged there. So I think the overall balance continues to be a challenge, particularly in a time of declining budgets.

That said, and I think General Oriki laid it out very clearly, and the numbers may not be exactly the same, but when you look at the new capabilities that are in these, the P8 airplane and some of the other systems that are coming out here, in addition to an increase in numbers, I think Secretary Hagel announced the other day we will have two additional Aegis destroyers that will be stationed here. They are not replacements; they are additional to the missile defense force that's already here. That's a significant commitment. So I think you will see us continue to do that.

I'd also strongly endorse what Admiral Saito said: the strength of two of us working together in a much more collective way, understanding each other, it's a very, very strong, what we call in the military, force multiplier, so it becomes, we become much more capable. And in fact, we may not need literally as much force. That's for us to work through and decide over time, but I don't think

under any circumstances we can be critical with respect to the United States and its focus on this region. When this was first announced, I happened to be in China three or four weeks later, and so it was like February of 2012, and the Chinese delegation that we were with asked us about what this pivot is. What is this rebalance? From their perspective we hadn't been away, which was a pretty strong message that our presence out here, while we've had other challenges, the US presence has been sustained and will be in the future, also.

What's going to be important is how we do this together in a world that demands multilateral activities, whether they're economic, diplomatic or military, and specifically then what are, in the military side, what are the forces that will be here and when, and where will they be and how will we use them, and I think that's important over time to make sure we're paying attention to the commitment.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] Thank you very much. I would like to raise one final question if I may. In enhancing the Japan-US Alliance there is another ally of the United States in this region, the Republic of Korea. On the relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea, how does it look from the US perspective? Of course you want further improvements in terms of the bilateral relationship between Japan and ROK I would expect. We cannot blame it on the other that the relationship is in such a situation, but I would like to ask both of you, General Myers and Admiral Mullen. The historic issues are becoming a bottleneck in terms of the improvement of the bilateral relationship, and therefore we cannot have a Japan-ROK summit or else we cannot have better military relations or share information and we cannot have further cooperation. We have not been able to reach a successful agreement as such.

So including the question of the rebalancing by the United States vis-à-vis this region, in terms of the US security policy vis-à-vis this region, what are the implications? I think there will be negative implications from the deterioration in the Japan-ROK relationship. Could you comment on this, please, the two of you?

Myers: I'm not sure I totally understood the last, the Japan ROK relationship and what? Having it...

Moderator: What kind of negative or positive or whatever impact on the US security policy toward this region?

Myers: Okay, well, first of all, just to go back to the original question, which ties into this one, about the rebalance. The rebalance I think was a renewed emphasis but not a renewed

philosophy. If you go back through national security strategies, as far back as I've ever read them, the importance of the Asia-Pacific to the United States, which considers itself an Asia-Pacific nation, has always been emphasized, and here was a chance to emphasize it again. As Admiral Mullen said, sometimes real world events get in the way of making that tangible in a way that probably was hoped in terms of forces and movements and so forth. Other folks in the world get a vote where the US has vital national interest. And of course as Admiral Mullen mentioned too, our inability to get our fiscal policy in order in the United States has created huge cuts to our defense budgets, which further limit things that we can do to fulfill our aspirations regarding things like the rebalance.

Having said that, I don't think the Japanese, the current Japanese-Republic of Korea tensions will have any impact on the rebalance. We are heavily involved in the Republic of Korea. I think the numbers are, are we around 30,000 or 28,000 now forces there? I don't think that's going to change any time soon as long as the young man who is in charge of North Korea is there. So I don't know that it's going to have a direct relationship. It is of concern and we did talk about it in the forum at some length.

As I mentioned earlier in the opening remarks that this is something that if there was a way for some of us that have relationships in Korea and in Japan, if we could facilitate making all that better I think we'd be more than willing to do it but we were thinking about that actually in the forum as part of our discussions. But I think as a direct impact on the rebalance or on the US-Japan relationship, it's just unfortunate that at this period of time the ROK-Japan relations are on a pretty low ebb, but there have been times when they have been very, very strong as well and where senior Japanese officials, to include military officials, have developed good relationships with their counterparts in the Republic of Korea. We just happen to be at a time where that's not the case.

Mullen: I would agree with General Myers that I don't think it has a huge impact on the region but it certainly isn't helping. Both my friends in Japan and my friends in South Korea say it's certainly at low right now, as low as it's been for a long time, and my view of this, and everybody is concerned about China, all we're doing is we're feeding China and we're giving China an advantage to play us off against each other because of the very difficult relationship, and there are many issues associated with why it is so difficult right now. I have always believed it's important for leaders to lead and it is really only leaders that can fix it; no one else can. I hope it doesn't deteriorate to a point where it really does impact the region in a very serious way because I think then we're into dangerous territory.

Myers: Let me clear up what I said. I don't believe it's going to have an impact on the alliance or the rebalance per se. I do think it could have an impact in the region, and perhaps a very deleterious impact, and I'm thinking about this year being the 100th anniversary of World War I where political leadership was not able to stem the tide of what was a serious incident but did not need to lead to World War I but did. I think the political leaders in the region have a responsibility to try not to back others into a corner where they don't have much political maneuvering room, and I think we see some of that in this particular tension that we're talking about, and I think that's unfortunate. And I think when certain leaders speak and the terms they speak in using hyperbole and other things can inflame folks and emotions to the point where it's hard to get back to normal, whatever normal is, but certainly more peaceful. I do worry about that. And I think just look back to World War I, read the history, and you see that's one of the dynamics that was working there that didn't allow them to pull back from the brink and so we had this horrible conflagration.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] Thank you very much Admiral Saito. General Oriki, would you like to add? If not, I would like to open the floor for questions. Please raise your hand if you have a question and please wait until I call upon you to ask your question. And for the sake of interpreters, please use the microphone, and please be concise in your questions. Anyone with a question, please.

This is the 100th anniversary since the First World War and there was a historical perspective that was mentioned in the discussion. This is very much like the atmosphere of the US-Japan Military Statesmen Forum to be able to hear such comment. Anyone? Yes, please. If you could, specify to whom you are asking your question.

Question: If time permits I have questions for all of the four panelists. Given the current security environment, the US-Japan security relationship is very important, I think. However, if there is too much emphasis on Japan-US relations and if there is concern about China, this may lead to a new cold war structure, some think. And in order to avoid that from happening, what can be done? Thank you.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] We only have 30 minutes remaining so maybe we can take a couple of questions from the floor before calling upon the panelists to respond.

Question: [*speaks in Japanese*] With regard to Japan-US cooperation, in terms of gray zone situations I have a question: for instance, if armed fishermen land on a Japanese island, what

kind of cooperation does the Japanese side seek from the US? And will the US be able to meet such a request? Will that be joint police action between Japan and the United States?

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] I see another hand up.

Question: [*speaks in Japanese*] The first question I'd like to raise is this. Former top uniform servicemen participated in the forum discussions. Including the recognition of history, do you have any requests for a diplomatic sector to play? This might be rather political so it might be difficult for you to comment on this, but I think ultimately we have to take that into consideration. That's why I'm raising this question. That's my first question.

With regard to the limited recognition of the exercise of the collective self defense right, a certain LDP former minister responsible for security matters made a comment and he drew a certain analogy in describing this. As Admiral Mullen has said, the United States remains a global power. It has various responsibilities in various regions around the world, so you are going to continue to serve as the policeman of the world. So the United States will continue to play this role. However, you have cutbacks in your budget and therefore the United States is becoming a rather elderly policeman. The exercise of the collective self defense right here in Japan is deemed as a kind of attempt for Japan to supplement the force that the United States is losing, so it's kind of like Japan serving as a police dog in a sense to back up the American policeman.

So I am quoting a comment by the LDP politician that Japan may become a police dog. What do you think of this? Do you think this is too self-depreciating?

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] I would like to stop taking questions now, because it gets difficult to keep track of them. There are four questions. Please pick up the ones that you would like to respond to. Maybe you can begin, Admiral Saito?

Saito: [*speaks in Japanese*] If there is too much emphasis on the US it may put China into a corner. I believe that was the intent of the question. Hedging alone is not sufficient, engagement and hedging, and how to balance the two, that requires wisdom. When it comes to discussion of this nature, there may be a misunderstanding that especially when military personnel talk, there is only discussion of hedging, but rather than focusing on hedging alone, actually there are discussions about balancing, engagement, and hedging. Furthermore, to invite or encourage China to participate in the international standards and how to establish such a mechanism. This is what we need to seriously consider.

There was also a mention of the Senkakus and whether Japan is a police dog or not. The process is under way to sort out the discussion and to establish and revise laws, and therefore in that sense I do not know. And specific operations, under which what Japan will do, what the United States will do, I think it's not appropriate to comment on that so I would like to refrain from answering that question.

And as for historical issues, as it was pointed out, we are retired military personnel and we are focused not only on military aspects but also on a broader perspective including diplomacy and security, and I believe that is the right thinking, the right approach. But with respect to historical issues, since ours was a forum of military-to-military people, although historical issues are important, we would rather not spend too much time on historical issues. So that was the case.

On whether or not Japan supplements the global power. I do not know what will be the result of the revisions of the laws. However, that will not be the case. When we look at the Cabinet decision, people may have wild conjectures. There is freedom to do so, but the legislative draft and Cabinet decisions, when we read the text, that is not what is intended.

Oriki: [*speak in Japanese*] So Japan and the United States should join hands. Would that ignite reentry into the cold war structure? That was the question. But compared with the days of the US and Soviet cold war, the degree of the interdependent economic relationship has been much raised and enhanced, and therefore we cannot really have a cold war structure limited to military aspects. That is not the day and age that we live in now, I think.

And with regard to gray zone situations, as Admiral Saito has said, the reconstruction of the legal basis, the legislation will be considered, but Japan-US cooperation must be further considered. But in terms of response to gray zone situations it is Japan which has to take the initiative and consider this question on how we should respond. This is my personal opinion. So that is a crucial point that I would like to seek your understanding.

On our requests in the field of diplomacy, I think now is the time when we have to have a total and comprehensive perspective, including economy, military, diplomacy and other fields. So as it is described in the National Security Strategy and also in the National Defense Program Guidelines, we have to take this comprehensive and interministerial stance. In order to match up diplomacy with security, the strategic implementation of the NSC is very important, and I expect much of this implementation.

And also the Cabinet decision on the collective self defense right, it can be applied globally; however, as Admiral Saito has said, the impact of the collective selfdefense right is the fundamental need, so it's not that the SDF is going to be dispatched everywhere around the globe like America's "some" dog, in any location and I don't feel that way myself. Our starting point is to think what is going on for the defense of Japan.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] So may I call upon General Myers?

Myer: To the first question on a strong Japan-US Alliance perhaps leading to a cold war structure, I agree precisely with what Oriki-san talked about. The cold war structure was the containment of the Soviet Union, and we could do that because there was no economic relationship that depended on some other strategy, so containment worked. But that won't work with China of course because we're all, all of us, the US, Japan, and China, dependent upon one another for our economic well-being, so I don't see how it could lead to a structure like that. And we've talked a little bit today about the US staying engaged with China in the military-to-military sense but otherwise as well, so I don't think that's a very good argument and probably doesn't apply.

The armed fishermen in the Senkakus, if I heard that right, if that was the question, that's one of those gray zone issues that are difficult to deal with because at least in the United States we would probably, since the US military can't get involved in civil law enforcement, you would first try that approach I think and that would involve in the United States probably our Coast Guard but it could be some other law enforcement agency, because we don't have a lot of Coast Guard out in the Asia-Pacific region for obvious reasons. So probably it initially wouldn't be handled in an alliance other than help in intelligence and surveillance and to know what's going on, but it would probably be left to non-military to deal with. This would be my guess.

We did receive a lot of information about the National Security Council and the national security staff and their role, and I agree again, when you talk about all instruments of national power being brought to a problem, that's where it occurs, and just like in the United States, that's where it occurs, and it looks like the structure that we were told about will be very good at that.

I will take exception to the words that the US is the world's policeman. I don't think that quite describes it. I think the US has a leadership role in the world to provide leadership to try to get to a more stable, more economically certain environment, and not policemen, so I think it was a very unfortunate choice of words by whoever uttered that trying to inflame people of course and it makes for good print maybe a great headline but it's hyperbole, it doesn't describe the situation very well, and it should be recognized as such.

Our first obligation is the mutual security treaty and the defense of Japan. That's the first obligation. The United States has other obligations as well in the region and around the world. I'm insulted by the notion that Japan would be serving as a police dog. It is a very unfortunate choice of words and absolutely incorrect.

Mullen: I fully agree on the issue, the question about cold war. I just don't think there's nothing that leads me to believe that we could get there, and I think General Myers laid out that the interdependence that we have amongst many nations, certainly to include China, that's going to continue just given the size of our economies for actually all three of our countries.

Although I do think it's an interesting part, and this has not come up, part of the discussion in the last couple of days did raise the issue of Russia, speaking of cold war, and I'm reminded because of my background. The emphasis in this region historically with respect to Russia is one that I paid a lot of attention to for many, many years. While I don't think we would ever get into any kind of situation that was cold war-like, certainly what Mr. Putin has done recently has sent shivers down a lot of people's spines. I think the world has got to pay attention to that because I think he will continue until he figures out that he has got to stop and I don't know that he has reached that point.

I just couldn't agree more strongly about the diplomats and the politicians need to lead on the history issue, very clearly. The military, retired and active, may have a view on that but it is, back to what I've said, leaders must lead on this to address the issues which I know are incredibly emotional and difficult, but that's why we elect them quite frankly to do that.

And then I also fully reject the issue, the moniker of policeman and police dog. The United States has been a global leader, it will continue to be a global leader. We're leading in a world now that it takes, the United States can't do it alone. It's been that way for a while. We've got to do it with partners. This alliance is critical in that regard. It is one of many. And I'd be very careful to relegate the United States, as some have, to history already. That's happened before without much effect, so I think the United States is going to be around. It feels responsible. We believe we can have a positive and constructive impact on the world, and we will continue to engage accordingly.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] Thank you. So perhaps we are able to take another round of questions.

Question: [*speaks in Japanese*] The importance of the US-Japan Alliance cannot be overstressed, clearly; however, there is curtailment of the US national defense budget and the current situation is such that the national power in the US is perhaps on the decline, and therefore the environment is more difficult for the US-Japan Alliance.

On the other hand, geopolitically, when we look at the Asia-Pacific region, other than the United States and Japan, for example, Australia or India, with these countries cooperation is increasing in importance, not only between the US and Japan but cooperation amongst these countries may be growing in importance as some point out, from the US as well as Japan's vantage point.

Specifically, with Australia and with India, as a means of hedge against China, what is expected from relations with Australia or with India? For example, the Indian Navy in the South China Sea or the Australian Navy in the South China Sea, the operations that these navies are able to engage in, that may be a possibility, so if there are any thoughts on this point.

I think it's more of a naval issue so my question is posed to Admiral Mullen and Admiral Saito.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] So we'd like to take a few questions before turning to the panelists for answers.

Question: [*speaks in Japanese*] I heard from the Japanese and US panelists, with regard to the collective self defense right, the US panelists are saying that Japan should exercise the collective self defense right to defend the Japanese people, but the Japanese panelists, I sort of had a hint of nuance that Japanese panelists want to protect also the United States. I suspect there is a slight difference in the nuance in the American and Japanese panelists.

If Japan is to exercise the collective self defense right, is it going to become a military superpower? I think that is what China and some other Asian countries are concerned with. Does the United States admit that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces can exercise a collective self defense right to become a military power? If not, how are you going to control the JSDF? My question is for the American panelists.

Question: I've noticed that there seems to be a bit of a theme of building a relationship between Japan and Australia and the US, and perhaps there might be something similar going on with regards to the Philippines.

I'm just curious for your opinions on where that could go. Could we see perhaps Australians participating in military exercises in Japan? The Japanese, I know there is some participation in Australia already but whether that might expand, whether there might be Japanese participation on something like Balikatan or PHIBLEX, and I think I heard the other day that maybe another Amphibious Ready Group was coming to the region. Could that be connected with to either Australia or the Philippines? Thanks.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] One more question? Yes, please.

Question: [*speaks in Japanese*] I am a complete amateur on military issues. Political, economic and natural resources issues were all discussed today. It's not just limited to US-Japan relations but it has expanded to global issues. So I think it was a very worthy panel discussion held at the Japan National Press Club.

I would like to pose a question to Admiral Mullen, because I believe Admiral Mullen is the best person to pose this question to. Under the George Bush administration and under the Obama administration, under these very different administrations, presidents with different personalities you were serving, and in Japan it so happens that we have seen changes of government from one extreme to another and there are some sensitive issues as a result of that and it is happening coinciding with a major change in the world, which is the cause of many problems.

And my question to Admiral Mullen is, to what extent should there be communication between military and politics and where is the line between?

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] So anyone who would like to insist upon a final question? Could you try to be short? .

Question: [*speaks in Japanese*] I have a question for Admiral Mullen. You said that the world navy should be united according to the division of work leading to global peace. It means that the Chinese Navy and US Navy should have joint operations, not try to exclude each other, so you think it's desirable that the two countries' navies should collaborate with each other. Is that conceivable? Do you have that in mind? What kind of cooperation do you want to see between the US and Chinese navies?

Question: [*speaks in Japanese*] I have a question for the two US participants. The deterrence against China by the US, how is it functioning? That is my question. You've mentioned that a containment policy will not be adopted for China and the United States welcomes the peaceful

rise of China, but seen from Japan, the behavior of China in the East China Sea and the South China Sea is unilateral and there is a great sense of dissatisfaction amongst many in the Japanese public.

So in that sense, is deterrence by the United States really functioning? That is a question that naturally arises, and if it's not functioning and if you could illustrate examples of how it is not functioning. For example, could we take nuclear weapon as a pre-condition for deterrence? In terms of economy, there is strong interdependence between China and the United States. Given that strong economic interdependence, will that be functional as deterrence?

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] Thank you for your questions. I would like to call upon the panelists to respond to whatever part of the questions which came up. Admiral Mullen, can you take the floor first?

Mullen: Maybe I'll answer them in reverse if I could. First of all, with respect to the deterrence, I mean one of the things that we actually talked about at this conference was the whole issue of deterrence, and I for one, I am a strong believer in it. It has to be as strong, it has to be from a position of strength to mean anything if you're going to deter some actions. And maybe I could just use the current situation in the Senkakus to answer that. It is not as intense as it was a few weeks or a few months ago. Does that mean it will intensify in the future? What happens with the oil rig? Will it come back? I don't know, and I just used that as a very small example. When you look back for 50 or 60 years of that, the stability in the region, it's been pretty extraordinary. We certainly have had difficult times, and it speaks to I think the commitment of the countries in the region as well as the United States and other countries quite frankly to sustain that.

The issue of the gray zones or the gray issues, they are tough. They are actually very relevant issues in the modern age, if you will, not just in this region but I think globally, and I'd use the Ukraine and the Russians as an example of that or Crimea as an example of that as well.

With respect to the Chinese Navy, the question on the Chinese Navy specifically, the Chinese Navy just operated, they had three ships operating in our biennial exercise called RIMPAC. That's a significant step forward, based on an invitation that was put out some time ago. They brought a fourth ship that turned out to be a spy ship. They weren't invited and that was obviously problematic. But what I would argue is that navies have a way of operating with each other that are away from the land, if you will, learning about each other, and then possibly using that as a stepping stone to a better relationship throughout the military as well as the country.

The question about military and politics, it's a very clear line to me. We're not in politics. I think I could speak for my Japanese counterparts because I've watched them up close and personal in very tough situations politically. I mean one of the challenges that I think both Saito-san and Oriki-san had was the political changeover here for a number of years which, when leadership changes that often it makes it very difficult, but ours is not to take a position politically, and in fact it's to be apolitical, and you follow the lead of the elected representative of the people in a democracy and it's a very clear bright line and we should never cross that.

I think the question about the Philippines and Australia and the United States, and I'll let my Japanese counterparts or colleagues answer the question about what Japan might do, but I think the more relationships the better. I think the more relationships the stronger. It's too easy to sort of take this line about decline, therefore we need to look somewhere else. That's just not the world that I've seen us live in quite frankly. We have many relationships with many countries, and for another country to have many relationships certainly I think strengthens the overall capabilities in the region and the stability in the region, so I encourage that.

I'm not sure on the nuance piece. I think Admiral Blair said it very well with respect to the collective self defense. Certainly, and I would say from a military perspective, I've been in a lot of military operations in the last ten years, to slice this so thin that it almost becomes impossible to execute, we have to be very careful with that. Leaders, political leaders, when they make decisions, have to give the military the guidance they need but then there's an awful lot that happens when things are ongoing, and so creating uncertainty and making it such a narrow area or so many controls, essentially it becomes very difficult to execute.

The question about the Australian Navy, the Indian Navy, and the question actually from my perspective, and I don't mean to offend the questioner, it gets into this zero sum mentality. It isn't zero sum. I think that we have an extraordinarily close relationship with Australia, our military, our country, we have for a long time. That's going to be sustained for a long time into the future.

We also have operated a great deal in and around the Indian Navy. They are a very good navy and so I encourage that relationship. It speaks to quite frankly like-minded countries in many ways in coalitions that can, I think, provide the kind of capability that preserves stability in the region and strengthens relationships very broadly between countries and amongst countries.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] Admiral Mullen, thank you very much for addressing each question. General Myers, please.

Myers: Okay, I'll quickly go through some of these questions. I'm not going to take the ones that Admiral Mullen answered so well.

On the political military piece, I was appointed as I think Admiral Mullen, I was appointed by a Democratic President to be vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by a Republican President to be the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And so at least the nature of the American military is that we're absolutely apolitical. In the jobs that we had, did we have one foot in the civilian world and one foot in the military world? Absolutely. We were at that intersection of military and political leadership, but we never, never strayed into the political leadership other than, no, they were right there, so it was very important. It's a cultural thing that's very important for the United States and we work very hard to maintain that.

I'm not going to talk about building the relationship between Japan, the US, and Australia. That's happening. There will be more of that I think in the future.

In terms, I think there was a question that talked about Chinese concern about collective defense meaning Japan will return to militarism. To me that shows a complete lack of what Japan has become in the last 69 or 70 years. Anybody who thinks Japan is going to turn some kind of corner and become something they're not I think is not well advised on the issue. I think Japan's actions over the last seven decades speak the volumes that need to be spoken to answer that particular question.

By the way, it might be interesting to note that I think the only country that the US has a relationship with, a defense relationship, where we can't do collective defense is Japan, and we have lots of relationships around the world. So I think it adds impetus to the fact that this is an issue of Japan normalizing, not becoming more militarily aggressive.

On the US, in my remarks, and it probably wasn't caught, but I said due to fiscal restraints, rebalancing probably hasn't gone to the depth or as quickly as US policymakers had hoped. I didn't say we had financial problems in the US. So if you look at the US economy and where it is, it's not the economy. All economies are pretty much in the doldrums today, but it's really our fiscal policy that we don't have in order; it's not our financial strength. The financial strength is actually there. So I'm like Admiral Mullen, I wouldn't count us out yet. One of these days we might actually get our fiscal house in order, and if we do then the defense budgets will probably go up. It's the fiscal constraints to the budget process that's really been the issue.

I might also align myself to something Admiral Mullen said which is I firmly believe there is no one problem in the world today that can be solved by one nation. There's none, whether it's environment, whether it's security-related, whether it's financial. We're all so interconnected, interdependent, and the problems are so big that we have to do this with our friends and allies, and that's just, I think that's a fundamental that you have to, at least I have to have in the back of my mind as I think about how we try to solve things. No one country can do it by itself.

Admiral Mullen answered everything else so well. I think that's it. Thank you. And thank you for allowing us to be here.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] So may I call upon General Oriki?

Oriki: [*speaks in Japanese*] Not only Japan and the United States, but in terms of joint exercises we have to have closer relationships with other countries as well. I agree wholeheartedly. If I may bring to your attention one point. The role of the military, the role of the Self-Defense Forces has gone through a major transformation. We have in mind not only hardware but disaster relief, humanitarian aid, we have to go in, and in the case of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, it's the military which came in first to the scene to save human lives. And also in terms of rescue and search operations, we are engaged them with India. We have also Japan-US-ROK cooperation. And in terms of training among many countries, we should step up such cooperation in every way.

Moderator: [*speaks in Japanese*] And now may I call upon Admiral Saito?

Saito: [*speaks in Japanese*] With regard to multilateral training I think General Oriki has described it so well, and General Myers and Admiral Mullen have also spoken so well. But as far as Japan is concerned, in terms of the Japan-US Alliance, this year marks the centennial since the First World War, and after World War I the Japan-United Kingdom Alliance was abolished and we moved on to a multilateral and four-country alliance in those days. This is ancient history in a sense, so maybe I should not raise this, but a bilateral treaty and multilateral treaty, there is a big difference and we should learn that from our past history.

So the multilateral frameworks are highly important but compared to the bilateral Japan-US Alliance, we should never lose sight of the fact that the Japan-US Alliance is the core relationship. That's my candid opinion.

Moderator: Now I would like to close the panel discussion. I think it was most impressive that each panelist has answered each question as thoroughly as possible. Thank you all for your cooperation.